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Minority Vetoes in Consociational Legislatures: Ultimately Weaponized?
DEVIN F.J. HAYMOND*
In societies emerging from or at risk for conflict, dividing power among rival
groups—called power-sharing—can be an appropriate arrangement to
maintaining peace. But how can groups, who are often emerging from violent
conflict, trust sharing a government with rival groups that were just recently
shooting at them?
A potential solution is the minority veto, which is allows minority groups to block
the government from harming those groups’ vital interests. But what sorts of
change blocking mechanisms constitute a minority veto? Who gets the veto power,
and when can they be used? Do minority vetoes function as effective incentives for
ensuring consensus-based support and the protection of minority interests, or are
they merely political weapons that logjam governmental actions?
This Paper outlines the advantages and disadvantages of various minority veto
design options in the context of consociational power-sharing arrangements, and
inspects the formal legislative minority veto mechanisms in Northern Ireland,
Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Minority vetoes can
successfully protect minority groups’ vital interests, but vetoes must be designed
effectively in the consociational arrangement in order to avoid the veto’s
weaponization, political deadlock, and increased tensions.
INTRODUCTION
Power-sharing is seen as a critical political strategy for dealing with protracted conflicts:
rival groups are more likely to accept peace when they are given a share of the power.1
Consociationalism, often equated with power-sharing more generally,2 is a theory of institutional
design for deeply divided societies pioneered by Arend Lijphart in the 1970s. The aim of
consociational power-sharing is to promote and incentivize consensus-based intergroup
cooperation by dividing power among rival identity groups. Consociationalism has four
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institutional pillars: (1) a “grand coalition” of all significant ethnic communities within a society;
(2) segmental autonomy; (3) proportionality; and (4) minority vetoes.3 The grand coalition and
segmental autonomy are the primary pillars, reinforced by proportionality and the minority veto.4
The first primary pillar of consociationalism is the grand coalition in which all major
groups involved in the conflict are represented.5 Leaders from all significant segments of society
come together in the coalition to govern the country with a general emphasis on consensusbuilding.6 Lijphart calls for an “overwhelming majority” of support needed in the grand coalition
as opposed to a mere majority.7 Willingness of group representatives to cooperate in the grand
coalition, and the power-sharing arrangement more generally, is a vital precondition for the
successful functioning of consociationalism.
The second primary pillar of consociationalism is segmental autonomy, or federalism.
Minority segments are given autonomy over matters that are not common to all segments to the
greatest extent feasible.8 Ulrich Schneckener describes two types of segmental autonomy—
territorial and personality. The former implies federal structures or territorial autonomy, whereas
the latter “is realized through elected, non-territorial, self-governing communal chambers . . . or
private institutions which obtain certain responsibilities for each community . . . .”9 Federalism
lends to the success of the grand coalition by removing a large number of potentially divisive
problems from the decision-making process and limits the scope of issues in front of a
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consociational government.10 By keeping groups separated and non-general issues decentralized,
Lijphart theorizes that groups will not feel threatened by other groups or that their cultural identity
is under fire. As will be shown below, segmental autonomy is perhaps the most important factor
to consider when designing a minority veto.
With the need for all groups to be represented in the power-sharing arrangement,
consociationalism calls for proportionality in all decision-making organs, including civil service
appointments, government subsidies, military service, and perhaps even courts.11 This is often
accomplished via the use of a proportional representation voting system or reserved seats.
Even though groups are guaranteed power and proportionality in the government, some
decisions of the central government may inevitably harm a particular group’s interests: “A veto
may be justified on the basis that guarantees of proportional representation of minority groups in
a power-sharing assembly and/or executive are not sufficient to protect the vital interests of that
minority because the minority may simply be outvoted.”12 When decisions affect the vital interests
of a minority segment, the legitimacy and acceptance of the power-sharing arrangement is
endangered.13 Thus, to provide assurance to each segment, Lijphart calls for granting minority
groups veto power that allows the veto areas of “vital interest.”14
Lijphart described the minority veto as the “ultimate weapon” available to protect minority
groups’ vital interests in a power-sharing arrangement.15 According to Lijphart, a minority veto is
successful if it (1) effectively protect minorities’ vital interests, and (2) is used sparingly and does
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not become a political weapon that derails the political process. 16 The primary debate in the
literature concerns whether the minority veto can avoid weaponization.
Lijphart argues that minority vetoes will not be weaponized because leaders will be
incentivized not to use the veto due to feelings of security, fear of reciprocal veto use by rival
groups, and the good will of leaders to avoid political deadlock.17 Critics of the minority veto are
highly skeptical of Lijphart’s arguments. They argue that conflict groups will not be inherently
disincentivized to abuse the “ultimate weapon,” and its inevitable use will increase tensions and
lead to political deadlock.
Another argument of Lijphart’s critics is that those who do not agree to the power-sharing
arrangement will use the veto with the purpose of sabotaging the political process and the powersharing arrangement in general.18 The acceptance of the power-sharing arrangement and a
willingness to coexist is a prerequisite for consociationalism and the restrained use of minority
vetoes. Of course there will be animosity between groups, oftentimes intense animosity, in powersharing arrangements, but that animosity cannot outweigh those groups’ acceptance of the powersharing arrangement. In those situations, any design considerations discussed below will be
minimally effective. Accordingly, this Paper will only be useful for the design of minority vetoes
in consociational power-sharing arrangements where groups have some minimum level of
willingness to accept the power-sharing arrangement, whatever that level may be.

“The provision works best if the minority veto does not have to be used very often in order to protect minority
rights and autonomy.” Arend Lijphart, The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation, 90 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 258, 262 (1996).
17
McEvoy, supra note 4, at 257.
18
Kelleher, supra note 12, at 5–6. “Where robust guarantees, including minority vetoes, are adopted, immobilism is
a strong possibility, and it may be very difficult to overcome the stasis that immobilism can produce.” Donald L.
Horowitz, Ethnic Power-sharing: Three Big Problems, 25(2) J. DEMOCRACY 5, 7 (2014).
16

4

The goal of this Paper is to provide recommendations and considerations for designing a
successfully functioning minority veto mechanism in a particular consociational power-sharing
arrangement, and to contribute to the existing literature by providing a taxonomy of formal
minority veto mechanisms presently existing in consociational legislatures. There are many ways
to design a veto mechanism that effectively protects minority interests, but to avoid the veto’s
weaponization and political destabilization, the minority veto should have a limited universe and
should trigger mandatory mediation procedures to promote intergroup cooperation and dialogue.
This Paper will proceed as follows. Part I illustrates the various ways that minority vetoes
can be implemented and expounds on the advantages and disadvantage of each design option. Part
II outlines the formal minority veto systems that exist today in the consociational power-sharing
legislatures of Northern Ireland, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Part III
provides recommendations and considerations for designing minority veto mechanisms in
consociational power-sharing arrangements. A brief conclusion follows.
I. MINORITY VETOES: DESIGN OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Though it is one of the four pillars of consociational power-sharing, Lijphart provides little
guidance on how to implement minority vetoes in practice. Minority vetoes can take several
different forms, and innovation in the field is ongoing. Vetoes can be found in the legislative
assemblies, multi-part executive systems, the military, or the judiciary.19 Likewise, vetoes can be
formally granted, meaning they are explicitly granted, or can exist de facto as a product of a
particular society’s demographic breakdown, voting system, and legislative majority

Allison McCulloch, The Use and Abuse of Veto Rights in Power-Sharing Systems: Northern Ireland’s Petition of
Concern, in 53 COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, GOV’T AND OPPOSITION 735, 738–39 (2018); Joanne McEvoy, We
Forbid! The Mutual Veto and Power-Sharing Democracy, in POWER-SHARING IN DEEPLY DIVIDED PLACES 253, 260
(2013).
19
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requirements.20 As previously stated, the focus of this analysis is limited to formal minority vetoes
in consociational power-sharing legislatures.
A successful minority is one that (1) effectively protect minorities’ vital interests, and (2)
is used sparingly and does not become a political weapon that derails the political process. An
overview of the literature reveals three central design features of minority veto: (A) who can
exercise the veto; (B) the matters over which the veto can be invoked; and (C) the effect of the
veto on the political process.
A. Who Gets Veto Rights?
The first key issue that arises in relation to minority veto mechanisms is identifying an
appropriate veto holder. Joanne McEvoy distinguishes between “predetermination” and “selfdetermination” of minority groups;21 Allison McCullough labels these methods as “corporate” and
“liberal,” respectively. 22 For the purposes of this Paper, the terms are used interchangeably.
Corporate veto rights refer to specifically naming groups who can use the minority veto
based on identifiable ascriptive characteristics.23 Corporate vetoes can be useful to get groups
central to the conflict to commit to the new political arrangement in the first place. 24 By
guaranteeing representation to specific groups, corporate minority vetoes are identifiable
assurances to minority groups who may be extremely cautious about entering into agreements on
the basis of general and vaguely worded grants of veto power.25 However, the corporate approach
runs the risk of excluding smaller minority groups the ability to protect their interests.
20

A straightforward example of an informal minority veto: Country A has two identity groups privy to the powersharing arrangement in which there is a 100 seat legislature. Group 1 constitutes 50 of seats in the legislature and
Group 2 fills the other 50 seats. If the voting threshold is 75%, each group will have a minority veto with 26
members, but they do not formally invoke a veto.
21
McEvoy, supra note 4, at 259.
22
McCullough, supra note 19, at 39–40.
23
Id.
24
McEvoy, supra note 4, at 255.
25
Id. at 259.
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Additionally, some argue that predetermination of groups central to consociations is incompatible
with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights regarding human rights of political
participation and that assigning a political office to a certain group is discriminatory and
antithetical to international human rights norms.26
Alternatively, a liberal veto relies on numerical voting formulae rather than ascriptive
features. Liberal vetoes do not exclude specific minority groups, thus granting smaller,
underrepresented minority groups the opportunity to rally support for veto declaration against
particular governmental action.27 Similarly, a liberal approach does not risk explicitly excluding
smaller minority groups. An advantage of self-determination is that it is up to the electorate to
identify with and vote for communal or non-communal parties, thereby determining the groups
that enter power sharing.28 It avoids fixing groups’ representation on a permanent or semipermanent basis. Furthermore, a liberal approach can be preferable as mobility decreases groups’
geographical concentration and shifts the overall demographics of the country.29
B. Vital Interests
A second design consideration for crafting an effective minority veto is the determination
of what “vital interests” the veto is meant to protect. Like the first consideration regarding who
can invoke the veto, the issues that qualify vital interests can either be predetermined or selfdetermined.
Predetermined vital interests exist in an exhaustive list, created by the parties present to the
particular peace process or constitutional process. Predetermination of vital interests limits the
veto’s universe, which helps prevent weaponization of the veto for areas that are not truly of “vital”

26
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interest. Allison McCullough is wary of using an exhaustive, predetermined list as it could fail to
capture all vital interests: “[W]hile there is a general trend towards identifying culture, language
and education as vital interests, this is not conclusive.”30 If the government is used to harm a
group’s vital interest, intergroup tensions could flare and put the entire power-sharing arrangement
at risk.
Conversely, self-determined veto rights permit much greater latitude for minorities as
groups are able to self-define their own vital interests. While a restrictive list can potentially fail
to identify issues that could end up drastically affecting a minority group’s interests, the selfdetermination approach ensures that vital minority interests will not be excluded from the minority
veto’s scope. Naturally, permissive self-determination of vital interests allows for greater potential
for abuse of the veto as a political weapon rather than as a shield. Self-determination approaches
offer flexibility and the ability to adapt to “circumstances on the ground as well as providing groups
with a level of confidence that their voices and their interests matter.”31
It is important to note that, when vital interests are predetermined, no invocation is
necessary; it is intended to be automatic, regardless of any invocation of the right, such as in
Kosovo. However, when vital interests are self-determining, invocation of the veto is required.
Invocation can take several forms. Invocation of Belgium’s Alarm Bell Procedure mandates a
justificatory clause that explains the vital interest at risk, while invocation of Northern Ireland’s
Petition of Concern simply requires the submission of a petition with the requisite number of
signatures.

30
31

Id.
McCulloch, supra note 19, at 752.
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C. Effect of the Veto
The third consideration is what effect the minority veto has on the political process. Veto
effect seems to be overlooked in the literature compared to the first two considerations, especially
in light of the importance of the incentives that vetoes provide to political actors.
Ulrich Schneckener outlines three types of veto rights: delaying veto, indirect veto, and
direct veto.32 Delaying vetoes suspend the legislation and implement mediation procedures.33 For
example, Belgium has developed a delaying veto called the “Alarm Bell Procedure.” If invoked,
the offending law is suspended from the parliament and the matter is then referred to the federal
cabinet, which must review the matter and send a “justified recommendation” to the involved
house of the parliament within 30 days.34 The federal parliament then reconsiders the matter in the
light of the federal cabinet's recommendation.35 Delaying vetoes are touted as being more
conducive to negotiation and mediation between groups. They have the effect of singling out
specific legislation for increased conversation between groups, which is an ultimate goal of powersharing arrangements. The legislation can still ultimately pass, which will avoid political deadlock.
However, without an ultimate guarantee that a particular bill will not pass, it cannot be said for
certain that a vulnerable minority’s interests will be protected.
Indirect vetoes include increased voting thresholds or concurrent majority requirements.36
For example, in Kosovo, laws that affect a community’s vital interest require “both the majority
of votes of present and voting deputies from majority ethnic community and the majority of votes
by the present and voting deputies from minority communities.”37 This allows a simple majority

32

Schneckener, supra note 9, at 205.
McEvoy, supra note 4, at 258
34
Id.
35
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36
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37
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of one community to veto the legislation. Indirect vetoes make it harder for a contentious bill to
be passed, but does not absolutely guarantee minority interest protection. Unlike the delaying veto,
there is no formally mandated mediation procedure for purely indirect vetoes, leaving no guarantee
of intergroup cooperation. Unlike a direct veto, legislation can still pass through an indirect veto,
which decreases chances for political deadlock but risks infringing on minority rights.
A direct veto has the effect of blocking legislation entirely.38 Minority groups can shoot
the legislation dead in the water. Direct vetoes are a guarantee to groups in the power-sharing
arrangement that legislation will not pass. Direct vetoes are criticized for allowing legislative
deadlock. Without mandated mediating procedures, there is no guarantee for intergroup
communication and cooperation, which, in the zero-sum scenario presented by direct vetoes,
would likely increase intergroup tensions.39
III. FORMAL LEGISLATIVE MINORITY VETOES TODAY: A TAXONOMY
Below is a taxonomy of formal legislative minority veto mechanisms in Northern Ireland,
Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. To provide context, each section will
provide a brief overview of each country’s consociational legislature. Then, each minority veto
mechanism is described in detail. Finally, a look at how each mechanism has functioned is
provided, save for the use of Macedonia’s and Kosovo’s minority veto mechanisms, for which I
could find little information.

38

McEvoy, supra note 4, at 258. To my knowledge, no direct minority veto mechanisms exist in consociational
legislatures today.
39
Id.
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FORMAL LEGISLATIVE MINORITY VETO DESIGNS IN USE TODAY
Predetermined/
Country
Liberal/Corporate
Effect of Veto
Self-Determined
Northern Ireland

Liberal

Permissive

Indirect Veto

Belgium

Corporate

Permissive

Delaying Veto

Bosnia
(Vital Interest)

Corporate

Self-Determined

Delaying Veto

Bosnia
(Entity)

Corporate

Self-Determined

Indirect Veto

Kosovo

Corporate

Restrictive

Indirect Veto

Macedonia

Liberal

Predetermined

Indirect Veto

A. Northern Ireland
The 1998 Good Friday Agreement established a power-sharing arrangement that,
combined with the 1998 Northern Ireland Act, resulted in the unicameral Northern Ireland
Assembly (“Assembly”) and the Northern Ireland Executive (NIE).40 The 108 members of the
Legislative Assembly (MLAs) are elected proportionally by single transferable vote. 41 At their
first meeting, members of the Assembly must register a designation of identity—Nationalist,
Unionist or Other.42 The Assembly has full legislative authority over areas that are not
“Excepted”43 or “Reserved”44 to Westminster. The Assembly has “full legislative powers on most

40

Northern Ireland Act of 1988, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Ireland_Act_1998.
Devolution Settlement: Northern Ireland, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/devolution-settlement-northernireland.
42
Good Friday Agreement, Strand One, 6 (1998).
43
Northern Ireland Act, Schedule 2 (1998).
44
Northern Ireland Act, Schedule 3 (1998).
41
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economic and social matters.”45 The Northern Ireland Executive runs the government on behalf of
the Assembly, and is comprised of members of all the major Unionist and Nationalist political
parties.46 It is made up of the First Minister and deputy First Minister who are equal joint Chairs,
two junior ministers, and eight other ministers who are nominated by the Assembly.47
Northern Ireland’s minority veto—referred to as the “cross-community” voting
procedure—is initiated by invocation of a “Petition of Concern.”48 Northern Ireland takes a liberal
approach regarding invocation of the veto as it merely requires 30 of the 108 members of the
legislative assembly to sign a Petition of Concern, regardless of their community designation.49
Northern Ireland’s minority veto mechanism implements a permissive approach that does
not restrict the use of the veto; the only restraint on the veto’s invocation is the thirty signature
requirement. Once those thirty signatures are submitted, increased voting thresholds are triggered,
making this an indirect veto. The contested bill can still pass if it gains either “parallel consent” or
consent by “weighted majority.”50 Parallel consent requires “a majority of those members present
and voting, including a majority of the Unionist and Nationalist designations present and voting.”51
Weighted majority requires a 60% overall majority “including at least 40% of each of the
nationalist and unionist designations present and voting.”52
There is a considerable amount of attention paid to Northern Ireland’s minority veto
mechanism, particularly in recent years, and it is widely agreed that the veto needs reform. The
45

These areas include health and social services, education, employment and skills, agriculture, social, security,
pensions and child support, housing, economic development, local government, environmental issues, including
planning, transport, culture and sport, the Northern Ireland Civil Service, equal, opportunities, and justice and
policing. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/devolution-settlement-northern-ireland.
46
Kelleher, supra note 12, at 3.
47
Overview of Government in Northern Ireland, NI DIRECT,
https://www.nidirect.gov.uk/articles/overview-government-northern-ireland
48
Id.
49
McCulloch, supra note 19, at 752.
50
Good Friday Agreement, Strand One, 4 (1998).
51
Id. at 5(i).
52
Id. at 5(ii).
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Northern Ireland Assembly collapsed in January 2017 when infamous “Cash for Ash” scandal
pushed the Northern Ireland’s two largest parties—nationalist party Sinn Féin53 and the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)54—to the breaking point in their relations.55 For roughly three
years, negotiations to reopen the government were unsuccessful Northern Ireland was without a
government.56 Abolishing or reforming the Petition of Concern, Northern Ireland’s version of the
minority veto, was one Sinn Féin’s primary demands in negotiation talks.57 One political observer
even called the Petition of Concern “the dirtiest word in politics.”58
Although designed to protect vital interests, Northern Ireland’s minority veto has largely
been weaponized for political purposes unrelated to the protection of vital interests. The numbers
show that the Petition of Concern was increasingly invoked over time: “In the first legislative
period between 1998 and 2003, only seven were filed, whereas 118 were brought forward in the
legislative period between 2011 and 2016.”59 The Petition of Concern has been used for issues that
are not specific (and thus, not vital) to either community, including marriage equality, welfare
reform, and investigations into assembly members’ personal conduct.60

53

Sinn Féin is the largest Nationalist political party in Northern Ireland. See generally Kimberly Cowell-Meyers &
Paul Arthur, Sinn Féin, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sinn-Fein.
54
See generally Kimberly Cowell-Meyers & Paul Arthur, Democratic Unionist Party, BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sinn-Fein.
55
For more information on the scandal, see Rory Carroll, Cash-for-Ash Fiasco: Northern Ireland's Enron on
Craggy Island, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/sep/28/cash-for-asharlene-foster-accountable-but-not-responsible.
56
Henry McDonald, Northern Ireland Assembly Reopens Three Years After Collapse, GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jan/11/northern-ireland-assembly-reopens-three-years-after-collapse; see
also https://howlonghasnorthernirelandnothadagovernment.com/about.html.
57
Stormont Talks: DUP Says Discussions Are at A ‘Critical Moment,’ BBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-51040786.
58
Allison McCulloch & Drew Mikhael, Northern Ireland Reforms ‘Ethnic Veto’ to Help Get Its Legislature Back to
Work, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2020 at 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/18/northernireland-reforms-ethnic-veto-help-get-its-legislature-back-work/#comments-wrapper.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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There are several deficiencies in Northern Ireland’s minority veto mechanism. First, the
veto mechanism is both liberal and self-determining, meaning anyone can invoke the veto for any
reason.61 This is particularly troublesome because the Assembly has wide-ranging legislative
authority, consequently giving the Assembly authority over areas of vital interest and the minority
veto a wide universe in which to operate. Second, there is no requirement for a justificatory clause
a petition to explain how the proposed legislation might infringe on a community’s rights.62
Additionally, the veto does not have a mandated deliberation process or deadlock breaking
mechanism that guarantees intergroup cooperation, which is both a goal of power-sharing and a
method of easing intergroup tensions.
B. Belgium
Belgium’s minority veto is referred to as both the “Group Veto Procedure” and “Alarm
Bell Procedure.”63 For certain votes in the federal parliament, deputies are required to designate
themselves as part of a linguistic group. To invoke the Alarm Bell Procedure, 75% of the members
of a linguistic group in either house of the bicameral parliament, must sign a “justified motion”
(i.e. a motion with reasons for invocation of the veto) claiming that “the provisions of a draft bill
or of a motion are of a nature to gravely damage relations between the Communities . . . .”64
Belgium’s veto is corporate as it grants the veto only to the three communities. Regarding when
the veto can be invoked, Belgium takes a permissive approach, allowing invocation any time the
requisite 75% of a linguistic group signs a “justified motion.” The Alarm Bell Procedure “can be

61

Id.
Id.
63
Kelleher, supra note 12, at 7.
64
1994 CONST. art. 54 (Belg.).
62
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applied only once by the members of a linguistic group with regard to the same Government Bill
or private member’s bill.”65
Belgium implements a delaying veto as invocation results in the offending law’s automatic
suspension and the matter is referred to the Council of Ministers in the federal cabinet. The Council
of Ministers, which must act by consensus rather than by majority, must make a “justified
recommendation” to the involved house in relation to the matter within 30 days.66 The federal
parliament then revotes on the matter in the light of the federal cabinet's recommendation and
expresses its opinion or decision.67
The Alarm Bell procedure has only been used twice, so it is safe to say that the mechanism
has not been abused.68 The significant levels of federalism in the country limits the universe of the
veto and thus the opportunity for abuse. Likewise, the 75% threshold for invocation of the veto
requires ethnopolitical groups to act by greater consensus and does not allow for political
extremists to weaponize the veto. The justification requirement helps avoid scenarios when the
veto is used nakedly over non-specific legislation (i.e. when the harm being argued is not specific
a particular group or groups’ vital interests). Additionally, the veto suspends rather than
immediately defeating the bill. Any potential concerns about the ultimate passing of a bill even
when the Alarm Bell has been rung are also greatly mitigated by the levels of federalism and
decentralization. In addition, cooperation and deliberation among groups is ensured when the
matter is referred to the Federal Cabinet, where the two main communities are represented equally
and must act by consensus of cabinet members.

65

Id.
Id.
67
Id.
68
McCulloch, supra note 19, at 756.
66
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C. Bosnia-Herzegovina
The Dayton Agreement resulted in a highly unique and somewhat complex federal
structure. Bosnia-Herzegovina consists of two entities: the Federation (largely Muslim-Croat) and
the Republika Srpska.69 Each entity retains “all powers, competence and responsibilities which do
not, according to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, fall within the exclusive competence
of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”70 Each entity has its own president, government,
and parliament, with substantial competencies over all issues except foreign policy, foreign trade,
monetary policy, refugee matters, and infrastructure.71 Each entity is also allowed to introduce its
own citizenship and maintain “special parallel relationships” with neighboring states (Croatia and
Serbia).72 After the entity division, there are cantonal, municipal, and local government divisions
in the Federation.
With high levels of federalism, the central government is politically weak.73 Each of the
three groups hold de facto a third of the posts in the Council of Ministers and in the three-member
state presidency.74 The central legislature, the Parliamentary Assembly, is bicameral consisting of
the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples.75 The House of Representatives, the lower
house, has 42 members, directly elected from their respective entities by proportional
representation for four-year terms. The House of Peoples, the upper house, has 15 members, which
are indirectly elected as they are appointed by the parliaments of the entities: 5 members elected
by the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska (5 Serbian delegates), 5 members by the
Bosniac club of the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and

69

General Framework for Peace, Annex 4 (1995).
Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution, art. 1 (1995).
71
Schneckener, supra note 12, at 209.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution, art. 1 (1995).
70
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Herzegovina (5 Bosniac delegates), and 5 members by the Croatian club of the House of Peoples
of the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (5 Croatian delegates). Proposed
laws must be introduced in the House of Representatives where they must pass through a
committee review and a first and second reading.76 The House of Peoples has an equal process of
law review and ultimately has the final say on whether or not a law is passed.77
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Parliamentary Assembly has two distinct veto mechanisms. First,
legislation of the Parliamentary Assembly can be vetoed if a majority of either Bosniac, Croat, or
Serb delegates, declare a proposal to be “destructive of a vital interest.”78 As it is given to only
those three groups, the veto is corporate.79 Vital interests are self-determined for this veto as the
constitution does not define the term in any way. If the invocation of the vital interest veto is
unobjected, the bill cannot pass. When a majority of the Bosniac, of the Croat, or of the Serb
Delegates objects to the invocation of the vital interest provision,
the Chair of the House of Peoples shall immediately convene a Joint Commission
comprising three Delegates, one each selected by the Bosniac, by the Croat, and by
the Serb Delegates, to resolve the issue. If the Commission fails to do so within five
days, the matter will be referred to the Constitutional Court . . . .80
If no harmonisation can be established by the Joint Commission . . . the
Constitutional Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be
addressed to decide finally whether the law in question relates to a vital interest of
a constituent people.81
The Constitutional Court will rule if the vital interest of the complaining ethnicity was threatened
and, if so, the bill cannot pass.82
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The second minority veto in Bosnia-Herzegovina is referred to as an “entity veto.”83 Even
with a majority of votes, if “[t]he majority of votes does not contain one-third of the votes of
Delegates from the territory of each Entity,” the law cannot be adopted. This entity veto is
corporate as it specifically grants the power to those delegates who identify as either Bosniac,
Croat, or Serb. The entity veto is an indirect veto as it increases the voting threshold to two-thirds
within each Entity. It also implements a mediation process in hopes of resolving the dispute. The
Constitution reads:
If a majority vote does not include one-third of the votes of Delegates or Members
from the territory of each Entity, the Chair and Deputy Chairs shall meet as a
commission and attempt to obtain approval within three days of the vote. If those
efforts fail, decisions shall be taken by a majority of those present and voting,
provided that the dissenting votes do not include two-thirds or more of the
Delegates or Members elected from either Entity.84
A proposal is dead if it fails the second round of voting.
The vital interest veto has not been used frequently, but the reason is likely because the
entity veto is more attractive. Birgit Bahtic-Kunrath argues the entity veto has been weaponized in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.85 He claims that the entity veto “enables the veto players to ‘hijack’ the
parliament for their exclusionary ethnic interests and discourages cooperation and compromise
between the veto players.”86 He argues that the small number of Entity representatives discourage
cooperation as representatives choose ethnic outbidding to retain their seat over cooperation.87
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D. Kosovo
On April 19, 2013, the Brussels Agreement was negotiated between the prime ministers of
Serbia and Kosovo. Under the agreement, municipal bodies in the Serb-majority north will retain
autonomy in matters like health care and education.88 Kosovo has a decentralization scheme in
which every ethnic group is given specific powers (non-territorial federalism).
Kosovo’s central legislature is unicameral that consists of 120 members elected by
proportional representation from six electoral districts, 100 of which are directly voted for four
year terms by proportional representation. The remaining 20 seats are given out as follows: 10
seats for the representatives of the Serbs, 4 seats for the representatives of the Romani, Ashkali
and Egyptians, 3 seats for the Bosniacs, 2 seats for the Turks, 1 seat for the Gorans. 89 In Kosovo,
no one party often has a chance of gaining power alone, so parties must work with each other to
form coalition governments.
The Constitution gives a special guarantee to minorities not to be overruled by the majority
on issues concerning their vital interests. Kosovo’s minority veto is corporate as the Constitution
grants the power specifically to each minority community. Kosovo’s Constitution predetermines
areas of vital interest in an exhaustive list. And it is an indirect veto as it results in increased voting
thresholds. Specifically, the Constitution reads:
The following laws shall require for their adoption, amendment or repeal
both the majority of the Assembly deputies present and voting and the
majority of the Assembly deputies present and voting holding seats reserved
or guaranteed for representatives of Communities that are not in the
majority:
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(1) Laws changing municipal boundaries, establishing or
abolishing municipalities, defining the scope of powers of
municipalities and their participation in intermunicipal and crossborder relations;
(2) Laws implementing the rights of Communities and their
members, other than those set forth in the Constitution;
(3) Laws on the use of language;
(4) Laws on local elections;
(5) Laws on protection of cultural heritage;
(6) Laws on religious freedom or on agreements with religious
communities;
(7) Laws on education;
(8) Laws on the use of symbols, including Community symbols
and on public holidays. 90
There is little information available addressing how Kosovo’s veto functions, which likely
means it is not abused. The predetermined vital interest list greatly limits veto points, making it
hard to abuse.
E. North Macedonia
The Ohrid Framework Agreement was an agreement on reforms and amendments to the
1991 constitution, resulting in recognition of ethnic Albanians and other ethnic minorities as
citizens of the Macedonian state, veto rights to ethnic minorities over laws affecting their vital
interests, increased recognition of the Albanian language, and a commitment to proportionality in
government.91 The central legislature is unicameral, with between 120 and 140 MPs (currently
120), elected by proportional representation from 6 electoral districts, each contributing 20 MPs.
Additionally, there are also 3 reserved seats elected from the Macedonian diaspora which are
awarded only if the voter turnout was sufficient.92
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Macedonia's approach is to bundle all of its ethnic minorities into a single bloc for the
purposes of minority veto protection. According to Macedonia’s Constitution,93 certain laws may
only be passed by double majority vote in the Macedonian Assembly, namely, a majority within
the Assembly as a whole that includes a majority of the votes of the Assembly members attending
who “claim to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia.”94
Though the mechanism is liberal, the political realities show that “the ethnic Albanians have
sufficient representation to veto legislation without the support of any of the other ethnic
minorities” while smaller ethnic minorities can never veto legislation without the support of ethnic
Albanians, meaning those groups are only protected to the extent that they overlap with the ethnic
Albanian group.95
Macedonia takes a restrictive approach as it has opted to predetermine the “vital interests”
of its ethnic minorities by specifically identifying each interest that is protected by veto rights.
According to Article 5.2 of the Ohrid Agreement,
Laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal
documentation, and use of symbols, as well as laws on local finances, local
elections, the city of Skopje, and boundaries of municipalities must receive a
majority of votes, within which there must be a majority of the votes of the
Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the
population of Macedonia.96
These increased threshold requirements fall into the indirect veto category. If there is a
dispute regarding the provision above, the Committee on Inter-Community Relations is tasked
with resolving the dispute.97 The Committee, elected by the Assembly, consists of 19 members—
7 Macedonians, 7 Albanians, and one member each from the Turks, Vlachs, Romas, Serbs, and
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Bosniaks.98 When application of the minority veto is contested, “the Committee shall decide by a
majority vote whether the procedure applies.”99
There is very little information available on whether Macedonia’s minority veto functions
successfully. The predetermination of vital interests gives the veto a small universe in which to
operate, and the Committee on Inter-Community Relations helps ensure that the veto is only used
for those purposes.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is important to craft a minority veto with the entire power-sharing arrangement in mind
to create a balance in the four pillars consociationalism. This Part highlights the minority veto’s
relationship to each of the other three pillars of consociationalism (grand coalition, federalism, and
proportionality) and highlights considerations and recommendations for the future design of
minority veto mechanisms in consociational arrangements.
A. Grand Coalition, Federalism, and Proportionality
The countries described above show that minority veto mechanisms can be implemented
in both unicameral and bicameral legislatures. If the legislature is bicameral, it should be noted
whether there is a division of competencies between chambers. Proportional representation should
be used for election of group leaders in order to ensure that groups are represented, but ethnic
outbidding needs to be avoided. Learning from Bosnia-Herzegovina, risks of ethnic outbidding
and outright veto weaponization can be mitigated by greater numbers of representatives per group
in the legislature.
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Federalism is an important condition for successful minority vetoes. Depending on the
federal arrangement and the electoral system, the veto can act as a check on the central government,
such as for Bosnia’s entity veto. Federalism is particularly important when considering when the
veto can be invoked. Federalism greatly reduces the likelihood that the minority veto will be used
as it largely takes sensitive subject matter off of the legislative table and gives it to each respective
group. If there is a high degree of segmental autonomy with decentralization of vital ethnic
interests to local self-governance, the universe of subject matter over which veto rights can be
asserted shrinks. Thus, veto rights are much less subject to abuse. In such circumstances, liberal
vetoes might be preferred in order to avoid excluding and alienating smaller minority groups.
Northern Ireland demonstrates how lack of federalism can lend to abuse of the veto, particularly
when paired with a self-determining approach for vital interests. Restrictive veto approaches can
moderate use of the veto in instances where federalism is not feasible or attainable, but that runs
the risk of leaving out vital interests.
Proportionality in the power-sharing arrangement ensures that particular groups are
represented in all stages of government, particularly the legislature. If underrepresented, groups
may feel threatened and may be more inclined to abuse the veto.
B. Identity of the Veto Holder
Determining who should get veto rights is context-specific for each societal conflict.
Groups privy to power-sharing negotiations following periods of violent conflict will likely find
explicit corporate veto power to be more attractive when agreeing to share power with rival groups
If the corporate approach is chosen, all major minority groups should be included in the powersharing arrangement. If the corporate approach is implemented, the veto mechanism should require
stringent intragroup voting requirements to avoid abuse, like with Bosnia’s entity veto. If an act of
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the legislature truly endangers that group’s vital interests, there should be no problem perfecting
the veto. If designing vetoes that rely on numerical calculations, demographic shifts are important
to keep in mind.
If there is a high degree of segmental autonomy with decentralization of vital ethnic
interests to local self-governance, the universe of subject matter over which veto rights can be
asserted shrinks. Thus, veto rights are much less subject to abuse. In such circumstances, liberal
vetoes might be preferred in order to avoid excluding and alienating smaller minority groups.
Additionally, the liberal approach is more compatible with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights regarding human rights of political participation as it does not predetermine
political rights to the detriment of smaller minority groups.
C. Vital Interests
Closely related to the level of federalism (since it relates to subject matter of the minority
veto) is whether vital interests are predetermined or self-determined. Limiting the areas over which
a veto can be invoked is a useful tool to restraining minority veto abuse and ensures that the veto
is used only for vital interests. However, the danger of leaving out subject matter that truly is of
vital interest should not be taken lightly. There is no template list of interests that are vital to all
peoples and societies; vital interests are specific to the society in question, so group leaders should
be heavily involved in the crafting predetermined vital interest lists.
Whichever style is chosen, justificatory clauses should be included. Belgium provides an
example of justificatory clauses in practice. They require parties to openly and directly point to
specific vital interests allegedly harmed by proposed legislation or government action in order to
invoke. This could have the added benefit of increasing communication and understanding
between groups.
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D. Effect of the Veto
As shown above, minority veto mechanisms commonly implement an indirect veto, which
raises voting thresholds. While this makes it easier for groups to block harmful legislation, there
is often no incentive for groups to engage in meaningful dialogue and collaboration. Accordingly,
systems will inject greater voting thresholds into delaying vetoes. Delaying vetoes, which trigger
a mediation process that encourages intergroup cooperation and deliberation, advance
consociationalism’s aim of consensus-based government. This process can implement an
independent body or the constitutional court, or both. In those groups, it is important that all groups
are represented, that those groups choose their own representatives, and that mediation is required.
A good example is the vital interest veto process in Bosnia, where the invocation of the veto is
reviewed by a joint commission and, if the joint commission cannot resolve the issue, then to the
constitutional court. Deadlock-breaking votes should act based on consensus or supermajority
support to ensure legitimate deliberation.
Where vital interests are predetermined, there is a textual basis for the justified motion and
the determination of vital interest infringement. This could provide the proper basis for review by
the constitutional court to determine if a vital interest listed in the constitution is actually violated.
Alternatively, where vital interests are self-determined, intergroup dialogue important between
groups and is less suitable for review by a court.
CONCLUSION
Minority vetoes can be effective if they provide the proper incentives for political actors in
light of the overall consociational power-sharing arrangement. The design of a minority veto is
heavily context-specific, so there are no generalizable best practices for minority veto design.
Federalism and decentralization seem to be the primary method of restraining the use of minority
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vetoes. With fewer issues subject to the vote of competing groups and with autonomy granted to
groups, fewer occasions arise in which minorities vetoes are necessary to protect minority interests.
The determination of minority veto rights should be an inclusive process that considers the rights
of smaller ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups that are not primary players in the power-sharing
arrangement. Regarding the effect that the veto has on proposed legislation, deliberation and
mediation procedures should be implemented to ensure deliberation between groups.
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